Tuesday, August 30, 2005
I have done some further reflection on the issue of assassination and think perhaps having developed the international moral standard, we shouldn't be hasty to discard it.
The behavior of modern heads of state in a world in which assassination is tolerated would be to avoid any situation that might provide the opportunity for assassination. Fewer speeches, not personal campaigning, little extra-territorial travel.
Perhaps the international agreement to eschew assassination benefits not just the heads of state, who needn't fear death at any moment by any hand, but also the people of their respective countries, who enjoy more personal contact with their leaders. Also, all nations benefit when frequent social intercourse between heads of states is afforded by the presumption of personal safety, as also is provided by the standards of diplomatic immunity.
Finally, brinkmanship is the hammer in the toolbelt of international relationships. Both sides must know certain ground rules -- e.g. if I launch nuclear missiles at Moscow, Moscow will launch nuclear missiles at me. Peaceful compromise is often the end result of brutal brinkmanship, as the Cold War showed (at least for the two parties at the chessboard).
A country can fairly easily factor in the resistance of a foreign adversary's citizens to war when considering how to force concessions. In an alternate universe where people despise war but are morally neutral on assassination, the ability to play the brinkmanship game might be lost. Assassination is so simple (if you don't think assassination would be even easier in my alternate universe, you don't appreciate the gains in war making afforded by the military industrial complex), so clean, so unsacrificial for the perpetrating country, that it would be the first threat, explicit rather than veiled, and what is the counter threat except retaliatory assassination?
On the other hand, it might arise that assassination was merely the precursor to every war, hence the heads of state and the people would inextricably be linked in sacrifice, which is a considerable change from the state of things now.
The behavior of modern heads of state in a world in which assassination is tolerated would be to avoid any situation that might provide the opportunity for assassination. Fewer speeches, not personal campaigning, little extra-territorial travel.
Perhaps the international agreement to eschew assassination benefits not just the heads of state, who needn't fear death at any moment by any hand, but also the people of their respective countries, who enjoy more personal contact with their leaders. Also, all nations benefit when frequent social intercourse between heads of states is afforded by the presumption of personal safety, as also is provided by the standards of diplomatic immunity.
Finally, brinkmanship is the hammer in the toolbelt of international relationships. Both sides must know certain ground rules -- e.g. if I launch nuclear missiles at Moscow, Moscow will launch nuclear missiles at me. Peaceful compromise is often the end result of brutal brinkmanship, as the Cold War showed (at least for the two parties at the chessboard).
A country can fairly easily factor in the resistance of a foreign adversary's citizens to war when considering how to force concessions. In an alternate universe where people despise war but are morally neutral on assassination, the ability to play the brinkmanship game might be lost. Assassination is so simple (if you don't think assassination would be even easier in my alternate universe, you don't appreciate the gains in war making afforded by the military industrial complex), so clean, so unsacrificial for the perpetrating country, that it would be the first threat, explicit rather than veiled, and what is the counter threat except retaliatory assassination?
On the other hand, it might arise that assassination was merely the precursor to every war, hence the heads of state and the people would inextricably be linked in sacrifice, which is a considerable change from the state of things now.
Thursday, August 25, 2005
Pat Robertson is in the news for foolishly calling for the assassination of Hugo Chavez, the president of Venezuela.
The blogosphere, and newspaper editorials have condemned it for its moral obtuseness.
Call me morally obtuse, but I don't see why if we have the option of sending in four CIA men to take out one Venezualan, that is not preferrable to sending in 100,000 U.S. servicemen to take on an equal number of Venezualan troups, the outcome of which is 1,000 dead American men and probably 10,000 dead Venezualan soldiers and civilians.
In what way is the second fair and honest, and the first not.
I do have two criticisms of Robertson's positions.
First, Hugo Chavez at this juncture is really not the kind of leader we should be threatening with assassination. He has some shady friends and possibly some shady goals, but presently he has done nothing that threatens U.S. security in a serious manner. Reserve the assassination talk for leaders that are a clear and present danger.
Second, as a policy, the U.S. should eschew assassination and seek to have it viewed worldwide as morally reprobrate for the same reason a frenchman with a pistol in the late 18th century might seek to have duelling judged as gentlemanly and fisticuffs viewed as barbaric -- he has the advantage over ninety percent of his countrymen.
The U.S. can go whereever it wants with its army, secure in the knowledge it is unassailable on the homefront. However, in the realm of assassination, we are on equal footing with almost every nation. Which country can't afford to send four men to the U.S. to make an attempt on George Bush's life?
Until we have the only bullet-proof president, it behooves us to stop the assassination talk.
Update: I'm glag I wrote this morning, so I'm not suspected of plagiarism. Of course, if I were plagiarizing Volokh, I'd have seemed a much better writer, plus I would have stolen some more points.
The blogosphere, and newspaper editorials have condemned it for its moral obtuseness.
Call me morally obtuse, but I don't see why if we have the option of sending in four CIA men to take out one Venezualan, that is not preferrable to sending in 100,000 U.S. servicemen to take on an equal number of Venezualan troups, the outcome of which is 1,000 dead American men and probably 10,000 dead Venezualan soldiers and civilians.
In what way is the second fair and honest, and the first not.
I do have two criticisms of Robertson's positions.
First, Hugo Chavez at this juncture is really not the kind of leader we should be threatening with assassination. He has some shady friends and possibly some shady goals, but presently he has done nothing that threatens U.S. security in a serious manner. Reserve the assassination talk for leaders that are a clear and present danger.
Second, as a policy, the U.S. should eschew assassination and seek to have it viewed worldwide as morally reprobrate for the same reason a frenchman with a pistol in the late 18th century might seek to have duelling judged as gentlemanly and fisticuffs viewed as barbaric -- he has the advantage over ninety percent of his countrymen.
The U.S. can go whereever it wants with its army, secure in the knowledge it is unassailable on the homefront. However, in the realm of assassination, we are on equal footing with almost every nation. Which country can't afford to send four men to the U.S. to make an attempt on George Bush's life?
Until we have the only bullet-proof president, it behooves us to stop the assassination talk.
Update: I'm glag I wrote this morning, so I'm not suspected of plagiarism. Of course, if I were plagiarizing Volokh, I'd have seemed a much better writer, plus I would have stolen some more points.
